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What should India put forward as the mitigation component 
of its climate contribution (or ‘Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution’ (INDC))? Since energy accounts for 77% of India’s 
greenhouse gas emissions, this question can only be answered 
as one part of a larger discussion about India’s energy future. To 
inform this discussion, models provide one potentially useful 
tool, if used appropriately. It is important that assumptions are 
clear, relevant policy questions are credibly explored and that 
results are clearly explained.
This study conducts a comparative review of seven recent India-
focused (not global) modelling studies that cover CO2 emissions 
from the energy and industry sectors to explore Indian energy 
and emissions futures until 2030,  with the explicit intention of 
informing several policy salient questions. The analysis focuses 
on the substantive results and bases of the reference scenarios 
that project the effect of current policies, and comments on the 
construction and comparability of the various low-carbon policy 
scenarios.
How do studies inform the multiple sustainable 
development objectives of energy policy?
India’s 12th Five Year Plan, and National Action Plan on Climate 
Change, promote a sustainable development approach to 
achieving multiple development objectives, highlighting energy 
for growth, energy security, inclusion, local environmental goals 
and addressing climate change. At the moment, however, avail-
able modelling approaches provide a limited analytical base 
to inform such multiple objective-based decision-making. Key 
gaps include:
Energy demand and hence energy efficiency potential is 
comprehensively discussed by fewer than half the studies. 
There is also very limited coverage of non-commercial 
biomass use;
Energy security is addressed by three studies, but with 
limited effect, since they do not fully internalize future 
production, world energy prices, or reserves;
Income distribution is included in the analysis by one study, 
but with limited insights for policy;
Local environmental issues, such as air quality are considered, 
but not presented, by two studies, although none examine 
land or water implications.
Incorporating multiple policy dimensions into models requires 
significant additional effort. Nevertheless, filling these gaps in the 
future would make modelling studies more relevant for policy.
What are the future trajectories of Indian energy demand 
and supply?
Energy demand
Despite its significance for understanding the scope for energy 
efficiency, several studies (more than half) do not provide com-
prehensive data on final energy demand. Based on the limited 
available data (3 out of 7 studies), transport and industry are 
projected to increase their share of total demand in reference 
scenarios, while the buildings sector share declines considerably, 
and agriculture reduces to a lesser extent. Notably, in comparison 
to recent growth rates in these sectors, these projections imply 
that growth in the buildings sector (including cooking) would 
slow down considerably and growth in agriculture would increase 
marginally. The basis for these latter trends is not explained, 
though likely driven in part by shifts from inefficient biomass to 
LPG for cooking.
Fossil fuel energy supply and energy security
Energy supply trends diverge considerably across studies, even in 
reference cases that seek to project the effects of current policies. 
However, a few policy relevant aspects of India’s fossil energy 
supply future can be discerned:
By 2030, coal use is projected in reference cases to be 2.5-3 
times current levels. Even under additional energy/climate 
policy scenarios, coal use is projected by all but one study to 
be more than 2 times current levels;
Oil use projections for 2030 reference cases diverges con-
siderably (1.5 times to 3.1 times current use), likely because 
of different transport sector assumptions, while gas use 
diverges from 2.1 to 3.5 times current levels, reflecting varied 
assumptions about gas use for electricity;
Available results for energy security (3 studies) in 2030 refer-
ence cases suggest import levels would increase significantly, 
to 40-52% for coal (more than double today), 88-93% for oil 
(compared to 78% today), and 40-70% for gas (versus 30% 
today). Due to model limitations, these results tend to reflect 
underlying assumptions rather than endogenous model 
choices;
In order to keep coal imports at current levels (about 20%), 
coal production would need to grow at between 5.1% and 
6.4% per annum until 2030. If the target of increasing 
domestic coal production from 600 MT to 1000 MT by 2019 
is met, coal production would have to continue growing at 
between 3.9% and 5.9% per annum until 2030 (versus a cur-
rent growth rate of 4.2%) to meet projected demand.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Electricity supply 
Differences in the fuel mix assumed for electricity generation play 
an important part in explaining divergence in energy supply trends:  
The studies project the 2030 share of coal in electricity 
output to range from 56% to 90% in reference scenarios, 
compared to 70% in 2012. This divergence, despite more 
agreement at the primary energy level, is likely due to di-
verse assumptions about the efficiency and utilization of the 
coal power plant fleet;
Nuclear power appears to be systematically overestimated; 
the studies project additions of 15-42 GW by 2030 (from a 
current base of 5 GW) although only 2 GW of nuclear capac-
ity have been brought on line in the last decade;
Renewable energy as a share of electricity supply in 2030 
ranges widely from 2-12% under the reference scenarios and 
12-31% under the policy scenarios. The reference range ap-
pears an under-estimate relative to recent trends; 
Fossil fuel free electricity sources are projected to provide 
anywhere between 7-31% of supply under reference sce-
narios by 2030 compared to 20% today, which can rise to 
25-55% under policy scenarios.
Carbon dioxide emissions 
The studies project India’s future greenhouse gas emissions, 
which is highly salient information in the context of preparing 
an INDC. Notably, the studies use GDP growth rates of 7.0% to 
8.75%, which assumes that over the next fifteen years, India can 
repeat the performance of the 2004-2012 period, when GDP 
growth averaged above 8%, while it has been far lower for most 
other periods of Indian history:
The studies project 2030 carbon dioxide emissions in the ref-
erence case of between 4000 MT and 5674 MT, an increase 
of two to three times 2011 emissions. In per capita terms, the 
range is 2.8 to 3.6 tonnes per capita, which is below the cur-
rent global average of 4.6 tonnes per capita;
The annual emissions policy scenarios represent approxi-
mately a 10-15% reduction from the reference range in 2030, 
with a considerable overlap between the two ranges;
The range of modelled emissions intensities suggest that In-
dia’s Copenhagen/Cancun 2020 target of 20-25% reduction 
from 2005 levels falls within the overlap between reference 
and policy ranges. A similar range of overlap in 2030 -- the 
low end of the reference range and the high end of the policy 
range – represent an emission intensity decrease of about 
40-45% below 2005 levels.
What are the cost implications of alternative energy and 
climate policies?
Evaluating the costs of alternative policies is critically important 
to policy choices. However, the studies offer insufficient data or 
insight to inform a robust discussion on costs:
Two of the bottom-up energy models report incremental 
energy investments for particular low-carbon scenarios. 
However, since they represent distinctly different alternative 
futures of the energy sector, the associated costs are not di-
rectly comparable. Further, they do not have the capacity to 
quantify the economy-wide impacts of higher energy prices.
The two macroeconomic models, on the other hand, only 
report GDP losses from low-carbon policies, but have limited 
granularity in energy sector representation. One study (NCAER) 
estimates annual discounted GDP losses in the range of $54 
billion for a $10/tonne carbon tax to $175 billion for an $80/
tonne carbon tax, equivalent to about 1-3 percent of GDP today. 
Another study (LCSIG) estimates annual average undiscounted 
GDP loss of $62 billion in 2007 prices (about $26 billion 
discounted at 10%), if spread equally across the period, which 
translates to an annual decrease of 0.16% over the period. 
These numbers too lack direct comparability, not only because 
of using different low-carbon policies, but also because of dif-
ferent underlying representations of the energy sector.
Enhancing the effectiveness of modelling studies for policy
The constructive use of models for policy would benefit from a 
structured process of dialogue and interaction between model-
ling groups and policymakers, aimed at the following improve-
ments:
Develop a credible reference scenario for all studies based 
on a common set of key assumptions, such as on the imple-
mentation of current policies and GDP growth, informed by 
expert and stakeholder opinion;
Develop policy scenarios through a process involving poli-
cymakers and stakeholders, including some common policy 
scenarios to enable comparison across models; 
Develop a common set of relevant outcome variables based 
on salient development outcomes, including economic costs 
of abatement, and social and environmental co-benefits and 
impacts;
Clearly and accurately communicate model results, notably 
including sensitivity analysis, key drivers and assumptions, 
such as on technology cost data, and the capacity and limits 
of different models, such as on assessment of costs.
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Key Messages
First, Indian energy policy-making would be well-served by 
greater clarity on future energy and emission trends. Existing 
studies present a broad range of reference case results, driven 
by divergent assumptions, making their use for policy-
making a challenge. Studies would better inform policy if 
accompanied by greater explanation of their results, points 
of divergence (e.g., renewable and nuclear penetration) and 
more information on particular areas (e.g. energy demand 
and overall cost accounting). Policy scenarios lack common 
measures necessary to make their results comparable.
Second, the studies collectively provide, at best, a limited basis 
for selecting an economy wide pledge for India’s INDC, such as 
an emissions intensity target. Reference emissions ranges are 
broad and limited information is available on costs of policy 
options. A consideration of sectoral actions would provide 
a complementary approach that relies less on long-term 
economy-wide projections.
With an eye to the future, India needs to enhance the 
process for energy and climate scenario analysis, led by the 
government, but built on an ongoing process of engagement 
with the broader modelling and policy research community. 
Further, over time, modelling capacity should be extended 
to analyze social and environmental outcomes. A structured 
process to inform strategic thinking on energy and climate 
change would be a prudent long-term investment.
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1What should India put forward as the mitigation component 
of its climate contribution (or ‘Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution’ (INDC)) for the Paris Climate 
conference? Since 77% of India’s greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions (excluding LULUCF) in 2011 came from the energy 
sector (WRI-CAIT 2.0), this immediate policy question can only 
be answered as one part of a much larger discussion about 
India’s energy future.
Formulating energy policy in India is a challenging task. The 
multiple economic, social and environmental implications 
are increasingly recognized, including in India’s 12th Five Year 
plan (Planning Commission 2013). Effective energy policy 
must juggle economic considerations such as adequacy of 
energy supplies, macroeconomic costs of energy imports and 
incentives for efficient energy use, social considerations such 
as energy access, environmental factors such as local air and 
water pollution, and global greenhouse gas emissions. The 
task is made more complex by considerable uncertainties 
about India’s energy future, such as future energy needs, 
alternative supply options, the cost of different sources and 
technologies and the trajectory of local pollutant and 
greenhouse gas emissions. Modelling studies that explore 
these futures and the uncertainties around them provide one 
potentially useful policy tool to assist consideration of long-
term energy and climate policy. 
This study conducts a comparative review of seven recent 
modelling studies that focus on exploring Indian energy and 
emissions futures, with the explicit intention of informing 
several policy salient questions, around which the paper is 
organised:
1. How do studies inform the multiple sustainable 
development objectives of energy policy?
2. What are the future trajectories of Indian energy 
demand and supply?
i) What is the future energy demand pattern?
ii) What is the profile of likely future fossil fuel 
dependence and implications for energy 
imports?
iii) What is the future of Indian electricity supply 
and the composition of the supply mix? 
3. How might Indian CO2 emissions grow over time and 
with what implications for India’s climate ‘contribution’?
4. What are the cost implications of alternative energy and 
climate policies?
5. How can modelling studies best inform policy discussion?
We conclude with key messages.
There are important qualifications to addressing these 
questions with a model review study approach. First, existing 
studies are typically undertaken by different institutions for a 
variety of different purposes, such as exploring energy security, 
development, and climate mitigation scenarios. Moreover, 
different models have different capabilities — 
some models are better suited to represent the energy sector 
in detail, while others are better able to capture interactions 
at an economy wide level. These different purposes and 
capabilities require that any comparison across studies only 
be undertaken with a limited scope. Our approach here is 
predominantly to focus on the ‘reference’ or baseline scenarios 
of each study, which are comparable because they all aim 
to represent current policies and targets. We comment only 
in broad terms on the various model ‘policy’ scenarios that 
provide outcomes due to a particular policy. 
Second, modelling studies are only one input into policy 
discussion; it is essential that energy and climate planning is 
also complemented by detailed sector-specific analysis that 
accounts for both technical and implementation challenges.
Third, the studies considered here are focused on India and 
cannot provide information on larger changes in world 
markets or global regulatory frameworks such as around 
climate change. 
INTRODUCTION
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This report reviews seven recent studies. Our criteria for selection 
were: recent vintage (2013 and beyond, with the exception of 
NCAER - 2009); a focus on India-specific studies (rather than 
global studies with an India component)1; direct application to 
the INDC context; and direct or indirect linkage or use by the 
government. Where a modelling group has multiple studies, 
we selected the most relevant given the criteria above, often in 
consultation with the group, and refer to additional supporting 
studies in the analysis. 
The full list of studies, along with salient details is presented in 
Table 1.2 The report focuses on CO2 emissions from energy and 
industry, since this is almost exclusively the scope of the studies.  
It is important to note that only one study (World Bank) doesn’t 
include all industrial CO2 emissions, and only four studies 
include all residential cooking demand.3
For each study we have designated a reference scenario 
(identifying current policies/targets and their full 
implementation) and one or more policy scenarios, categorized 
as weak, intermediate, and stringent (based on emissions profile) 
where there are three or more scenarios. Our analysis focuses 
on comparable results across models, and also examines and 
explains underlying assumptions and interprets specific results, 
where possible. Most of the models use an end-date of 2030 (or 
in some cases 2031 or 2032). Where models use a longer period, 
such as 2050, we show results for 2030 for comparability. Select 
model results are presented in visual form with supporting text. 
Detailed data underlying the figures are in the Appendix. 
Our methodology included consultations with each of 
the modelling groups, in the form of individual meetings, 
correspondence over data details, and a stakeholder workshop 
to provide input and feedback to our findings. 
APPROACH AND METHODS
TABLE 1: STUDIES REVIEWED
Study Name (Abbreviation) Institution/author and Date Model Type Study 
Timeline
List of Scenarios (scenarios selected for 
analysis in bold)
Expert Group On “Low Carbon 
Strategies for Inclusive Growth” 
(LCSIG)
Planning Commission, 
Government of India, 
April 2014
Activity 
Analysis Model 
(Top-Down)
2007-
2030
Baseline Inclusive Growth (Reference), 
Low Carbon Inclusive Growth (Single 
Policy)
Climate Change Impact on the 
Indian Economy – A CGE Modelling 
Approach (NCAER)
National Council for Applied 
Economic Research (NCAER), 
December 2009
Computable 
General 
Equilibrium 
(CGE)  Model 
(Top-Down)
2003/04-
2030/31
Reference (Reference), Revenue 
Positive Carbon Tax at $10, $20, $40, $80, 
Revenue Neutral Carbon Tax at $10 
(Weak Policy), $20, $40 (Intermediate 
Policy), $80 (Stringent Policy)
The Energy Report – India. 100% 
Renewable Energy by 2050. 
(TERI – WWF)
The Energy and Resources 
Institute (TERI), 
December 2013
MARKAL 
Model 
(Bottom-Up)
2001-
2031*
Reference Energy Scenario 
(Reference), 100% Renewable Energy 
Scenario (Single Policy)
Energy-Emissions Trends and Policy 
Landscape for India (Shukla et al.)
P. R. Shukla, Amit Garg, Hem 
H. Dholakia, January 2015
Integrated 
Assessment 
Model (IAM)
2005-
2030**
Business As Usual (Reference), Scenarios 
1 (Weak Policy), 2,3,4 (Stringent Policy), 5 
(Intermediate Policy)
A Sustainable Development 
Framework for India’s Climate 
Policy (CSTEP)
Centre for Science, 
Technology and 
Environment Policy (CSTEP), 
January 2015
Integrated 
Energy Model 
(Bottom-Up)
2012-
2030
Business As Usual (Reference), Policy 
Scenario (Single Policy)
Energy Intensive Sectors of the 
Indian Economy: Path to Low 
Carbon Development (World Bank)
World Bank, February 2014 World Energy 
Model  
(Bottom-Up)
2007-
2031
Scenario 1 (Reference), Scenario 2, 
Scenario 3 (Single Policy)
India Energy Security Scenarios 
2047 (IESS)
Planning Commission, 
Government of India, 
IESS web-tool
Excel based 
simulation 
model 
(Bottom-Up)
2012-
2032***
Determined Effort Scenario (All Level 
2s) (Reference), Maximum Energy 
Security Scenario: Determined Effort 
(Weak Policy), Maximum Energy 
Security Scenario: Heroic Effort 
(Intermediate Policy), Minimum 
Emissions Scenario (Stringent Policy)
* The study provides data till 2051. However, the range of data for 2001-2031 has been selected to enable comparison with other studies.
** The study provides data till 2050. However, the range of data for 2012-2030 has been selected to enable comparison with other studies.
*** Data from IESS web-tool, accessed on 31 January 2015. IESS provides data till 2047 and data for 2012-2032 was selected to enable comparison with other studies.
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How do studies inform the multiple sustainable 
development objectives of energy policy?
India’s 12th Five Year Plan, and National Action Plan on Climate 
Change (NAPCC), promote a sustainable development 
approach to simultaneously achieve multiple benefits: 
energy for growth, energy security, inclusive growth, local 
environmental goals, and addressing climate change 
(Planning Commission 2013, 112-143; PMCCC 2008). Ideally, 
model projections would also incorporate multiple objectives 
in order to be fully policy relevant, recognizing that there 
are considerable challenges to developing models that can 
address the full breadth of objectives. Table 2 inventories the 
coverage of various objectives across the studies. 
Energy, Energy Security and Emissions: All the studies explicitly 
discuss energy supply. However, less than half the studies 
provide comprehensive details on demand side energy, a key 
element for understanding any future energy representation. 
Some studies include a demand representation as part of 
their model, but do not provide sufficient data to inform 
policy or make clear their demand characterization. Similarly, 
only CSTEP, IESS and TERI-WWF quantitatively assess energy 
security. While all the studies report emissions, only the 
macroeconomic models explicitly derive emissions intensity. 
The results of energy and emissions findings are discussed in 
the next two sections.
Inclusive Growth: Only one study, the LCSIG, sets out to 
explicitly address inclusive growth. The model includes 
ten expenditure classes to model income distribution and 
represents inclusive policy through government transfers for 
social objectives. However, because income distribution across 
classes is assumed using a constant Gini coefficient4, and 
because both scenarios adopt the same inclusion criteria, the 
effects of inclusion versus non-inclusion aren’t informative.5
Local Environment: Two studies, CSTEP and Shukla et al., 
consider local environmental effects. Both studies suggest a 
calculation of air pollution outcomes, such as from transport, 
although neither presents these in their study outcomes. 
CSTEP notes that their current study is in an interim form 
and that future reports will look at additional sustainability 
considerations such as air, water and land quality.
In summary, existing studies provide limited insight into policy 
relevant objectives beyond energy supply and emissions. Costs 
of alternate policies are unevenly covered across studies, and 
are discussed in detail in a subsequent section. It should be 
noted, however, that incorporating multiple policy dimensions, 
such as air pollution, requires significant additional effort. 
Nevertheless, filling these gaps in the future would help the 
policy relevance of modelling studies.
TABLE 2: INFORMING MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES
Objectives LCSIG NCAER TERI-WWF Shukla et al. CSTEP World Bank IESS
Energy for growth
Supply g g g g g g g
Demand 0 g g g
Energy Security g g g
Inclusive growth 0
Local environmental objectives 0 0
CO2 mitigation
Emissions g g g g g g g
Intensity g g
Costs g g 0 0
g Full coverage: Reasonably comprehensive and transparent treatment 
0 Partial coverage: Addressed to an extent, but falls short in some respects, including accessibility
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What are the future trajectories of Indian energy demand 
and supply?
It is necessary to understand the possible evolution of India’s 
energy sector in order to assess future development pathways. 
All the studies discussed examine the energy sector, albeit to 
different levels of detail. Here, we focus on how the studies 
project the near energy future until 2030, by examining 
the reference scenarios that seek to capture current policy, 
assuming their full implementation and also comment, in 
brief, on the policy scenarios run by the models. This section 
examines final energy demand, fossil fuel primary energy 
supply, and the electricity sector.
What is the future energy demand pattern?
Understanding future patterns of energy use is critical for 
energy and climate policy because there is significant potential 
for reducing energy dependence and emissions from demand-
side measures. Sectors such as buildings, transport, and 
industry can form the bulk of reduction in emissions intensity, 
up to 23-25% from 2005 levels by 2020 (Planning Commission 
2011). Future fossil fuel needs and consequently future import 
shares also depend on realistic projections of energy demand. 
In addition, the sectoral composition of final energy is 
fundamental to assessing the scope for co-benefits, as targeted 
demand side interventions can simultaneously achieve savings 
of energy, carbon and cost, better local environments, and 
increased energy security. 
Despite these potential gains, only three of the seven studies 
report data on final energy demand – CSTEP, IESS and TERI-
WWF (Figure 1, Table 3), even though five of the seven models 
are technology-detailed and therefore suited to examine 
energy sub-sectors. Moreover, even among these three, 
the studies provide sectoral assumptions at various levels 
of specificity, and with limited linkages between salient 
assumptions, integrated narratives or storylines, and aggregate 
trends. Macroeconomic studies have less fine-grained energy 
sector representation and use broad assumptions across 
sectors about autonomous energy efficiency improvements. 
There are a limited number of overarching trends apparent 
from Figure 1 and Table 3. For example, transport and industry 
are projected to increase their share of total demand in 
reference scenarios, while the buildings sector share declines 
considerably, and agriculture reduces to a lesser extent. 
Notably, when compared against recent growth rates in these 
sectors, these projections imply that growth in the buildings 
sector would slow down considerably (from 5.1% in the last 
decade to between 0.9% and 3.3%) and growth in agriculture 
would increase somewhat. 
One explanation for the slowing of building demand growth 
is that residential cooking demand reduces considerably due 
to the replacement of inefficient traditional cook stoves with 
efficient LPG stoves. For instance, both IESS and TERI-WWF’s 
reference scenario assumes this switch, though at a more 
aggressive rate in IESS than in the TERI-WWF study. However, 
besides TERI to an extent, none of the studies explicitly discuss 
non-commercial biomass demand and the uncertainties in 
assessing its evolution and contribution to GHG emissions. 
Shukla et al. report non-commercial biomass, but only as 
part of primary energy. This relatively thin treatment of non-
commercial biomass across the models neglects an important 
part of future energy demand, particularly for India’s poorest. 
The resulting total and sectoral final energy demand in 2030 
differs considerably across these models. For instance, the 
range for buildings demand is 2470-4081 TWh (factor of 1.65) 
and that for transport demand is 2571-4488 TWh (factor of 
1.75). While such a range of uncertainty is entirely reasonable, 
being able to identify key drivers and pinpoint particular points 
of departure between studies would make the projections 
more useful for policy.
TABLE 3: FINAL ENERGY DEMAND: CURRENT AND PROJECTED SHARES (CSTEP, IESS AND TERI-WWF) 
Recent Trends Reference Scenarios (2030/31/32) Policy Scenarios (2030/31/32)
Share (%) 
2010-11*
Growth Rate (%)**
2001/02 - 2010/11
Share (%) Growth Rate (%) Shares (%) Growth Rate (%) 
Industry 35-44 7.5 44-51 5.6-6.6 43-56 5.1-5.6
Buildings*** 39 5.1 22-25 0.9-3.3 19-30 -0.17 to 2.8
Agriculture 5-7 2.6 4-5 3.7-4.3 3-6 2.0-3.7
Transport 13-18 7.4 22-27 6.9-9.4 18-24 5.0-7.4
* Source: MoSPI (2012) for lower range and TERI (2013a) for higher range.
**  Source: Calculated from TERI (2013a)
*** Buildings includes residential and commercial sectors. For recent trends, 14% is from commercial use and the rest is non-commercial (TERI, 2013a). 
Recent trends growth rates are commercial only.
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Interestingly, although policy scenarios incorporate additional 
energy and climate policies, the sectoral shares in policy 
scenarios are relatively similar to those in reference scenarios. 
This could mean that energy efficiency opportunities have 
comparable potential across sectors, or it could also mean 
that the results are driven by relatively aggregate assumptions 
of efficiency improvement that cut across sectors. Without 
further detail or discussion of results, it is unclear how to 
interpret these outcomes.
What is the profile of likely future fossil fuel dependence and 
implications for energy imports?
Projections of future fossil fuel energy needs and the relative 
share of imports are of considerable policy significance for 
India. Availability of these fuels, or their substitutes, could 
enable or limit growth, but also increase reliance on imports 
and exacerbate local environmental problems. To what extent 
and how do the studies inform these policy questions? Figure 
2 and Table 4 summarize projections of total primary fossil 
energy supply for the five studies (except NCAER and World 
Bank) for which this information was available. 
According to reference cases, fossil fuel use is projected to 
continue rising through 2030, at a slightly lower rate than 
recent trends for coal, and in line with recent trends for oil and 
gas. Notably, GDP growth rates used tend to be higher than 
recent trends, as discussed further in the section on emission 
trends below.
According to the reference scenarios, it is immediately 
apparent that there is fairly close convergence across the 
studies on future coal use, at around 2.5-3 times current coal 
use in 2030, with coal continuing to dominate the fossil energy 
mix. Even under the policy scenarios, under various energy or 
climate policies, the scenarios suggest coal use will at least 
double, with the exception of the TERI-WWF 100% renewables 
scenario where coal is 1.5 times current use in 2030.
There is far greater divergence in oil and gas supply projections 
in the reference cases, with a factor of two between the 
lowest and highest projections for oil (1.5 and 3.1 times 
current levels) and 1.5 for gas (2.1 to 3.5 times current level). 
The broader spread on oil likely reflects varying assumptions 
about the future transport sector, which today contributes 
almost 40 percent of oil consumption. However, there isn’t 
enough information on transport demand characteristics to 
fully understand the different views. The divergence in gas 
projections is driven by different views of gas penetration in India’s 
electricity mix, ranging from 3% (LCSIG) to 8% (TERI-WWF). 
FIGURE 1: FINAL ENERGY DEMAND BY SECTOR IN 2030
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Notably, under policy scenarios as well, both oil and gas 
increase by at least 1.5 times. For gas, almost all the policy 
scenarios (with the exception of the IESS) project higher 
gas use in the policy scenarios than in the reference case, 
suggesting that increased gas use is likely to be a major share 
of any future CO2 emissions reduction approach. As with 
reference scenarios, the spread of projected growth rates is 
much larger for oil and gas than for coal.
The most significant implication of these patterns of fossil 
use is that fossil import dependence would rise to over 50% in 
the reference cases, and drop significantly below that under 
the various policy scenarios (Table 5). Three studies (TERI-
WWF, C-STEP, IESS) explicitly examine energy imports, of 
which only one (TERI-WWF) endogenously determines coal 
penetration based on its relative costs.6 Table 5 starkly shows 
the high degree of overall import dependence. Coal imports 
are estimated at 40-52% versus about 20% today (Ministry of 
Coal 2014) and 88-93% for oil. Interestingly, while some policy 
scenarios envision steeply reducing coal imports to more 
manageable levels, oil imports stay high across all scenarios in 
all the three studies. 
Notably, import shares are driven more by construction rather 
than by endogenous model choice. This is because none of the 
models have the capabilities (as yet) to represent domestic 
and foreign upstream fuel sectors. For instance, TERI-WWF 
assumes oil production will plateau by 2016/17. IESS defines 
its maximum energy security scenario by import constraints 
(of 21%). The relationship between domestic production 
and imports is most pertinent for coal, and merits some 
elaboration.
Since coal imports have grown at 23% per annum in the 
last decade, restricting further growth would be of policy 
interest. In order to keep imports at current levels (~20%), coal 
production would need to grow at between 5.1% and 6.4% per 
annum (based on the range of reference scenarios) until 2030. 
This would be equivalent to meeting the Coal Minister’s target 
of increasing domestic coal production from 600 MT to 1000 
MT by 2019, and then growing at between 3.9% and 5.9% per 
annum until 2030. 
Accelerating or maintaining growth rates of domestic 
production for purposes of energy security is, however, only 
one aspect of the necessary policy context. Also of policy 
salience are the local environmental consequences of coal use. 
For instance, a two-to-three fold increase in coal consumption 
could contribute to a doubling of local air pollutants such as 
particulate matter, leading to a doubling of health impacts 
(Conservation Action Trust, India and Urban Emissions, India 
2014). Specifically, premature mortality from coal-fired power 
plants would rise to 229,000 annually by 2030, and asthma 
associated with these plants may affect 42.7 million people. 
Another study highlights the water stress that thermal power 
plants can lead to, especially as there is a track record of 
clustering plants in particular locations. Thus, plants granted 
environmental clearance as of 2011 are estimated to require 
4.6 BCM of water per year (Dharmadhikary and Dixit 2011). By 
way of comparison, Delhi’s population is estimated to require 
about 1.6 BCM per year.7
In sum, to enhance the value of fossil energy projections for 
informing policy, a deeper understanding of the drivers of 
these projections would help. Key sectoral assumptions, such 
as the implications of different transport scenarios for oil use, 
and the role of gas in the future grid, need to be adequately 
debated and explored within the context of the models. 
Further, the discussion on energy security requires a consistent 
framework for reporting of data, but also, over time, better 
integration between energy sector models and those that 
explore broader macro-economic effects and world energy 
prices. Finally, the biggest lacuna is a lack of attention to local 
environmental effects.
TABLE 4: CURRENT AND PROJECTED TRENDS IN FOSSIL FUEL SUPPLY
Recent Trends 2003-4 to 2013-14** Reference Scenarios (2030/31/32) Policy Scenarios (2030/31/32)
Total growth rates (%) Domestic production 
growth rate (%)
Multiple of current 
(2012) use in 2030 
Growth rate 
(%)
Multiple of current 
(2012) use in 2030
Growth Rate 
(%)
Coal 7.5 4.2 2.5-3.0 4.7-6.0 1.5-2.8 2.2-5.8
Oil 4.1 1.3 1.5-3.1 2.4 – 5.3 1.5-2.4 2.3-4.5
Gas 5.5 1.1* 2.1 - 3.5 4.3 – 7.2 2.2-4.0 4.0 – 8.0
*  Gas production dipped sharply after 2011-12 due to decline in production in the K-G basin. If 2001/2-11/12 is taken the rate goes up to 5.2%
**  Recent Trends from Coal Controller’s Organization (2012), Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas (2013), Ministry of Coal (2011).
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TABLE 5: FOSSIL FUEL IMPORT DEPENDENCE (TERI-WWF, CSTEP, IESS)
Recent Trends 2003-4 to 2013-14* Reference scenarios (2030/31/32) Policy scenarios (2030/31/32)
Import Share (%) Import Growth Rate (%) Import Shares (%) Import Share (%)
Coal 26 23 40 – 52 0 – 21
Oil 78 5 88 – 93 81 – 86
Gas 30 13*** 40 – 70 20 – 73 
Overall Import 
Dependence** 43 51 – 52 24 – 36 
*  Recent trends from Department of Commerce (2012). 
**  Overall import dependence ranges do not include TERI – WWF. 
***  Gas imports are for 8 years (2005/6 to 2013-14) because gas imports were zero before 2005. 
FIGURE 2: TOTAL PRIMARY FOSSIL FUEL ENERGY SUPPLY IN 2030
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What is the future of Indian electricity supply and the composition 
of the supply mix? 
Electricity production accounted for 38% of total primary energy 
use in India (2010),8 and 38% of greenhouse gas emissions or 
47% of CO2 emissions (2007).
9 Adequate and reliable electricity 
is required for industrial development, and to meet social 
objectives such as health, education and livelihood. The future 
evolution of India’s electricity sector carries economic, social and 
environmental implications. For example, 400 million people 
in India are currently unserved by electricity (Ministry of Home 
Affairs 2011). What do the studies reviewed tell us about the 
future of Indian electricity, and what questions do they throw up 
with regard to clarity about the future (Figure 3, Table 6)? 
There is broad agreement across studies that electricity supply 
needs will substantially increase in the coming two decades. 
Total electricity supply is projected in reference scenarios to 
increase three- to four-fold between 2012 and 2030 (See Figure 
2). Even the lowest policy scenario projects an increase of 2.5 
times current levels. 
Coal continues to dominate the electricity supply mix under 
reference scenarios, but there is substantial variance across the 
studies on the extent of that dominance, ranging from a low of 
56% share of generation to a high of 90% (compared to 70% in 
2012). This divergence, despite more agreement at the primary 
energy level, is likely due to diverse assumptions about the 
efficiency and utilization of the coal power plant fleet. Among 
the policy scenarios the lowest possible coal share projected 
was 43% (IESS Stringent scenario), which is highly unlikely, 
as it would require turning off power plants that are already 
under construction today (IESS Report, 54).
The share provided by gas and hydro are projected, in the 
reference scenario, to at most retain their current shares, or, 
at the low range of the scenarios, to decline. In the policy 
scenarios, the share of gas increases from 9% to at most 14%, 
and hydro marginally increases. At the low end of the policy 
scenarios, both their shares decrease. Together, the projections 
suggest that gas and hydro, while continuing to provide 
scope for moderate share of electricity (on the order of 10%) 
are unlikely to dramatically ramp up their contribution, even 
under stringent policies. 
Perhaps most striking, the reference case projections for future 
nuclear power and renewables seem most at odds with the 
past. Though only 2 GW of nuclear capacity have been brought 
on line in the last decade, the models project additions of 15-42 
GW by 2030 (excluding one model that projects no additions) 
from a current base of 5 GW.10 The basis for such an optimistic 
view of nuclear power potential in the studies is unclear. 
The largest uncertainties relate to the growth rates of 
renewable energy, which, under reference scenarios, vary by 
a factor of four in the reference scenarios. The low range of 
these scenarios are highly conservative with respect to recent 
growth, while the upper end are more moderate than recent 
ambitious government targets for 2022 (100 GW solar and 
60 GW wind power).11 At the lowest end of the range, the 
LCSIG projects an RE share of 2% in 2030, which is below the 
current share of 3.9%, and would presume a growth rate of 
3.9%, compared to the short run three year growth rate for 
renewables of 21.5% from 2010-11 to 2013-14 and for wind (RE’s 
primary driver) of 20.1% from 2005-06 to 2013-14. The high 
end projects a 12% share (393 TWh by 2030, Shukla et al.), 
which  would require a growth rate of about 14%, until 2030, as 
compared to the (aspirational) growth rate of 23% until 2022 
required to meet the government’s targets of 100 GW solar and 
60 GW wind (which corresponds roughly to 297 TWh) for 202212. 
Under policy scenarios representing supportive policies, 
the highest projected shares of RE range from 12-31%, with 
corresponding growth rates of 12.3-19.3%. The high end of this 
range would require that recent RE growth rates are sustained 
for the next fifteen years. 
Finally, in the context of climate discussions, it is useful 
to examine the fossil fuel free (FFF) share of electricity, 
comprising renewables discussed above plus hydro and 
nuclear.13 The reference scenarios project a broad range of FFF 
share from 7% to 31%, while the current 2012 share is 20%. 
Given that RE is the most rapidly growing segment of the 
electricity sector, and hydro and nuclear are projected to grow 
rather than shrink, it is difficult to imagine circumstances 
where the low end of this range will become reality. The policy 
scenarios project a FFF range from 25% to 55%, with the 
majority clustered around 25% to 35% and two substantially 
higher between 50% and 55% (driven by a 100% renewables 
goal and explicit assumptions about high levels of renewable 
penetration respectively). 
These projections of India’s future electricity mix suggest 
widely divergent projections on the future electricity mix in 
2030 even in reference scenarios. Adequately informing policy 
will require narrowing these reference case divergences by 
more informed and reasoned assumptions for each fuel source. 
The ranges are particularly large in the rapidly changing 
renewables sector, with implications for India’s share of fossil 
fuel free electricity.
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FIGURE 3: ELECTRICITY SUPPLY MIX IN 2030
TABLE 6: PAST AND PROJECTED FUTURE TRENDS IN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY
  Recent Trends*** Reference scenarios (2030/31/32) Policy scenarios (2030/31/32)
Sources Generation  Share  (%)  
2012
Growth Rate (%) 
2002-03 to 2012-13*
Shares (%) Growth Rates (%) Shares (%) Growth Rates (%)
Coal 70.2 6 56- 90 5.2-8.9 43-63 2.2-7.0
Gas 8.6 -3 3-8 0.9-6.2 1-14 -5.9-9.0
Nuclear 3.5 7 1-8 -0.1-12.7 1-14 -1.8-14.5
Hydro 13.1 6 4-11 0.4-6.6 7-14 3.2-6.6
Solar 0.1 322.3 0-4 11.4-27.0 5-11 27.0-35.6
Wind 2.8 20.1 1-7 3.7-11.8 8-19 11.8-16.2
Biomass 1.0 14.6 0-2 -12.7-12.1 0-3 -12.7-13.1
Total** 100.0 4 100 6.4-7.5 100% 4.8-7.6
             
RE 3.86 21.5 2-12 3.7-14.2 12-31 12.3-19.3
FFF (Fossil 
Fuel Free)
20.51   7-32 1.1-10 25-55 6.9-12.3
*  Historical growth rates for renewable energy sources are based on available data, since 2002-03: 3 years for solar, 9 years for wind and 6 years for 
biomass. Because of inconsistencies across sources, the growth rate for FFF has also not been computed.
**  The total does not exactly equal the sum of the rows above, as it excludes an additional “other” category that is defined differently in the various studies.
*** Recent trends from Central Electricity Authority (2012a, 2012b).
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How might Indian CO2 emissions grow and with what 
implications for India’s climate ‘contribution’?
India’s climate positions, as discussed earlier, need to be built 
on a solid understanding of energy needs and likely futures. 
Figures 4 to 7 illustrate the range of emission futures for total 
CO2 emissions, per capita emission, emissions intensity and 
emissions versus energy intensity respectively. For each graph, 
the envelope of possible trends drawn using only available 
beginning and end year data is plotted on the left, with the 
specific study data on the right of each graph. Table 7 further 
summarizes the range for each metric.
Together, the studies represented in Figure 4 provide what is 
probably a robust upper bound and a probable lower bound on 
emissions in 2030. The upper bound is likely robust because it 
represents an increase in fossil use from a relatively high GDP 
growth rate of 7.0-8.75% between 2015 and 2030 along with 
an increasing share of coal in primary energy. The lower bound 
is likely because although the scenarios at the lower end of 
the range entail an aggressive penetration of renewables and 
nuclear, they too assume equally aggressive GDP growth, 
which, if overstated, would counteract the effect on emissions 
reductions of overestimating renewables. The lowest emissions 
reference scenario for which data is available (Shukla et al.) 
projects an increase in fossil fuel free share of electricity 
ranging 20% in 2012 to 31% in 2030 (or 11 times and 9 times 
increase in generation over today, for renewables and nuclear 
respectively). 
The reference scenario projections show annual emissions of 
4000-5674 MT by 2030, an increase of between a factor of 2 and 
3. To put these numbers in international context, US emissions 
in 2011 were 5333 MT, toward the higher end of the Indian 2030 
projections, and Chinese emissions were 9035 MT in 2011, almost 
double India’s projected 2030 emissions.14 Based on the US INDC 
of a reduction by 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025 (UNFCCC 
2015), US GHG emissions (including non-energy sources) would 
be about 4.5 Gt in 2025 (Damassa 2014), suggesting India could 
be the second largest global emitter within the next decade. 
FIGURE 4: ANNUAL CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS
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However, the picture looks very different with per capita 
emissions (Figure 5). Even after doubling or tripling per capita 
emission levels, India’s 2030 emissions are in the range of 
about 3.25 tonnes/capita, +/- 0.45 tonnes, which on a global 
scale is relatively narrow. Notably, this 2030 range is well 
below the current 2011 world average of 4.6 tonnes/capita. 
The policy scenario range, at 3421-5486 MT, represents 
approximately a 10-15% reduction in the envelope of possible 
annual 2030 emissions (Figure 4). However, there is a 
substantial overlap between the bottom end of the reference 
range and the top end of the policy range, suggesting that 
across studies, there is considerable uncertainty in how and 
what current policies will be implemented. To unpack this 
requires attention to the details of individual scenarios. 
Notably, however, even the lowest end of the policy range 
(the minimum emissions scenario in Shukla et al.) projects a 
near doubling of emissions from 2011. The policy projections 
as a group, therefore, are hard to interpret as compared to 
reference ranges, but do suggest that, even under stringent 
policy conditions, India’s emissions are likely to grow 
considerably in order to meet development needs.
TABLE 7: INDIA’S CO2 EMISSION TRENDS
Base Year 2011 Reference scenarios (2030/31/32) Policy scenarios (2030/31/32)
CO2 Annual Emissions (MT) 1861 4000-5674 3421-5186
CO2 Emissions/capita (Tonnes) 1.5 2.8-3.7 2.2-3.4
Emissions Intensity (kgCO2/$GDP PPP-2007) 0.44 0.26-0.36 0.17-0.28
FIGURE 5: CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS PER CAPITA
Individual Study Outputs (2030)*
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Figure 6 on emission intensity trends portrays particularly 
policy salient information, including India’s earlier Copenhagen/ 
Cancun pledge juxtaposed against future projections. 
However, this graph has to be interpreted as an illustration of 
trends, rather than a reference for particular values. The five 
bottom-up or technology-detailed studies (besides LCSIG 
and NCAER) set GDP exogenously, and so implicitly assume 
policies have no impact on GDP. Their GDP in 2030 has thus 
been simply derived based on assumed growth rates.15 
With these caveats, Figure 6 suggests that reference 
projections range from 23% to 45% below 2005 levels of 
emission intensity, and the policy scenarios range from 
40% to 64% below 2005 levels. Given these ranges, India’s 
Copenhagen/Cancun pledge of 20-25% below 2005 levels 
in 2020 falls about at the low end of the range projected by 
reference scenarios and the high end of the range projected 
by policy scenarios. Equivalently, for 2030, the low end of the 
reference range and the high end of the policy range are about 
40-45% below 2005 levels.
Figure 7 provides a way of analyzing the relative emphasis, 
in reference scenarios, of energy efficiency versus a shift to 
low-carbon energy sources for a sub-set of studies for which 
this computation was possible. Thus, TERI-WWF projects a 30 
percent decline in energy intensity versus a 40 percent decline 
in emissions intensity, suggesting a relative emphasis on low 
carbon sources, while CSTEP represents the other extreme of 
relatively more emphasis on decreasing energy intensity.
Interpretation of emission trends, however, has to be 
undertaken with caution and informed by an understanding 
of how these projections were derived. Studies use somewhat 
different interpretations of what constitute ‘reference’ 
emissions; some studies hold current outcomes constant, such 
as the share of renewables in the case of LCSIG, while others 
FIGURE 6: CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS INTENSITY
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hold current plans constant (e.g., Shukla et al., World Bank), 
with implications for direct comparability. 
In addition, emissions are substantially driven by GDP growth 
assumptions. The studies here use (or project) a range of GDP 
growth rates of 7.0-8.75%; this range likely accounts for a 
substantial portion, but not all, of the variation in reference 
scenario emissions. Past trends  were 6.1% from 1991-2000, 
7.1% from 2001-2010, and 5.5% from 2011-2013, with the 
strongest period of growth from 2004-2012, when growth 
averaged above 8%.
A few key assumptions can over-determine outcomes, 
particularly in top-down economic models that characterize 
the energy sector through a limited number of parameters 
such as total factor productivity and autonomous energy 
efficiency improvement. For example, the LCSIG and NCAER 
use very different numbers for total factor productivity growth 
with substantial consequences for the outcome – LCSIG uses 
1% for the agriculture sector and 1.5% for the non-agriculture 
sector while NCAER uses 3% across all sectors. While differing 
assumptions are justifiable, it is important that the reasons for 
these assumptions are transparent and are explained in the 
narrative accompanying discussion of model results. 
Interpreting and comparing policy scenarios is particularly 
challenging since the studies reflect different constructions of 
policy. For example, Shukla et al. is driven by a total CO2 emissions 
cap, C-STEP’s scenarios are constructed within a sustainable 
development framing, and NCAER studies the impact of a carbon 
tax. Each policy scenario ideally should be interpreted in the 
context of the policy question that is being asked.
Finally, projections of emissions intensity are particularly 
fraught. This requires modelling both GDP accurately as well 
as the feedback between different energy futures and policy 
and GDP outcomes. 
FIGURE 7: ENERGY INTENSITY VERSUS EMISSIONS INTENSITY IN REFERENCE SCENARIOS
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•  Reference scenarios are not equivalently defined, but in general, attempt to reflect full implementation  
of currently committed policies.
• Actual values of energy and emissions intensity for 2011 are 0.134TOE/$GDP PPP-2007 and 0.441 kgCO2/$GDP PPP-2007 respectively. 
•  35% subsitution equivalence considered for nuclear, hydro and renewables to calculate primary energy supply values (Source: Global Energy 
Assessment, Chapter 1: Energy Primer) 
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What are the cost implications of alternative energy and 
climate policies?
Evaluating the costs of alternative policies is critically 
important to policy choices. However, the studies offer 
insufficient data or insight to inform a robust costs discussion. 
To begin with, different types of models account for different 
types of economic cost. The bottom-up energy models 
have the capacity to track energy investments, but not the 
economy-wide and energy demand adjustments to higher 
energy costs. The two macroeconomic models (LCSIG and 
NCAER), on the other hand, do characterize GDP losses from 
low-carbon policies, but have limited granularity in the energy 
sector representation to detail investments. Moreover, since 
the models all construct different policy scenarios and have 
different technology cost assumptions, the policy costs aren’t 
comparable across models. Notably, none of the studies 
present mitigation costs, per unit of carbon reduction, as an 
explicit output.
Substantively, two bottom-up energy model studies show 
incremental investment costs, but for very different policy 
scenarios. The World Bank estimates investments of $1.4 
billion/year discounted at 10% for a low-carbon scenario that 
entails a number of low-carbon measures across the economy. 
However, these estimates do not account for all the costs of 
energy efficiency measures (World Bank 2011, 36). To place 
these numbers in context, India’s renewable investments were 
about $6 billion in 2013 (Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF 
2014). In contrast, TERI –WWF calculates future (primarily 
between 2036-2051) incremental investment costs of at least 
Rs. 517 trillion (or $81 billion per year in $2007-PPP discounted 
to 2007 at 10%), to achieve (close to) 100% renewables by 
2050.  As these scenarios aren’t comparable, neither are the 
costs. Though the effective mitigation costs (per tonne of CO2) 
may be inferred from the studies, this comparison may be 
inappropriate without placing them on a common footing or 
accounting for complete economic costs.
The macroeconomic top-down studies are able to model the 
interaction between the broader economy and energy policies. 
NCAER estimates annual discounted GDP losses in the range 
of $54 billion for a $10/tonne carbon tax to $175 billion for an 
$80/tonne carbon tax,17 equivalent to about 1-3% of GDP today. 
Notably, however, the model is calibrated to the structure of 
the economy from 2003-04, which it carries forward to the 
end of the scenario period in 2030. As a result, the model has 
limited ability to capture structural changes in the economy 
such as technological shifts, which likely introduces an upward 
bias in costs. 
The LCSIG, on the other hand, estimates a cumulative loss 
of $1344 billion (2011 prices), which translates to an annual 
average undiscounted GDP loss of $62 billion in 2007 prices, or 
about $26 billion discounted at 10%, if spread equally across 
the period.18 This translates to a decrease in GDP of 3% in 2030 
or an annual decrease of 0.16% over the period. Due to lack of 
full details on cost accounting, it is hard to conclude whether 
this is an under-estimate or an over-estimate. As with NCAER, 
the LCSIG model uses a fixed structure of the economy over 
the fifteen year period. The energy sector changes are driven 
by explicit assumptions such as higher total factor productivity 
growth in certain subsectors, specific penetration rates of 
renewables and so on. The GDP loss figures are driven by the 
re-direction of investment due to expensive energy, which 
extracts an opportunity cost in other areas of the economy. The 
net effect is that GDP loss figures are shaped by estimates of 
investment needs, which are in turn determined by technology 
costs that are not explicitly discussed in the report. 
Collectively, the studies give a mixed impression of costs. 
Some of the bottom up models suggest low costs while others 
are high, but these are not directly comparable. The two 
macro-economic models present a wide range of costs but 
for different, and non-comparable, policy scenarios. A better 
estimate of cost would require a careful integration of granular 
energy sector representation and macroeconomic effects. 
15CENTRE FOR POLICY RESEARCH, NEW DELHI
Lessons on using models to effectively inform policy
As this analysis of energy studies shows, models can 
potentially assist policymakers in understanding the 
influence of future technology choices, use patterns, and 
market developments based on a stylized representation of 
the energy sector and the economy. However, to avoid being 
misleading, it is also important that policy-makers understand 
the assumptions being made about the business as usual 
future, the policy questions being asked in the scenarios, 
the capabilities and limits of the underlying model and the 
relationship between these and the final results. Ensuring 
models effectively inform policy is useful not only for India’s 
2015 INDC process, but also for broader energy planning 
in India. This review suggests a few lessons to enhance the 
effective use of models for policy-making.
First, the policy value of the modelling exercise is enhanced 
by a credible ‘reference’ or ‘business as usual’ scenario to serve 
as a baseline against which the implications of additional 
policies modelled can be understood. The studies are relatively 
contemporaneous (2013-2015 with one exception) and use 
a relatively similar set of current policies as the basis for 
their reference scenarios. Yet the reference scenarios diverge 
considerably. This is likely because of different assumptions 
about GDP growth rates and different interpretations of policy 
implementation, such as in renewables and nuclear energy. 
For instance, solar capacity expansion by 2030 is assumed to 
be almost nil in one case (LCSIG) and about 80 GW in the most 
optimistic case (IESS), and in many cases without adequate 
explanation.19 While there may be a basis for different views 
about technology adoption in the next fifteen years, these 
positions need to be carefully argued and justified. 
Since reference scenarios are meant to serve as a baseline, they 
would be more useful to policymakers if they were grounded 
in common expert judgment of the likely achievement of 
currently known policies and targets based on an assessment 
of path dependence and government efforts, and a reasoned 
assessment of likely trends. This process of reasoning would be 
greatly assisted by a mechanism for discussion and sharing of 
information across modelling groups.
Second, the policy scenarios are intended to provide informed 
answers to ‘what-if ’ questions associated with particular future 
policy choices. These include the effect of different policies, 
technologies or economic futures on energy and emission 
trends, trade-offs and co-benefits. For example, scenarios 
could focus on different economic growth rates, an emphasis 
on energy security, or the implications of different nuclear 
energy adoption. In addition, the time-frames used for the 
study shapes the questions that can be asked. For example, a 
focus on 2030 emphasizes lock-in effects, while a longer term 
time period to 2050 (Shukla et al. and TERI-WWF) allows for 
transformative shifts (e.g., an all-electric vehicle fleet) and the 
effect of delayed policies (as done by Shukla et al.). 
To increase the utility of modelling tools for policy, it 
would help greatly to have more up-front involvement 
by policymakers and stakeholders in identifying the 
key questions and providing input on assumptions. It is 
particularly helpful if there is a process through which policy-
makers can interact with modellers to specify and discuss 
policy-relevant questions. Indeed, the more the modelling 
process is used as a process of dialogue, both to understand 
the priorities of various stakeholders, as well as use their 
knowledge to generate input assumptions, the more modelling 
studies can inform policy. A useful illustration is the South 
African Long Term Mitigation Scenario process, which was built 
around sustained interaction between government, 
stakeholders and modellers to explore alternative visions of 
South African energy and climate futures (Raubenheimer 2011).
Moreover, the value of modelling studies is enhanced if the 
same question can be asked of multiple models, in order to 
develop a more robust analysis. To do so requires harmonizing 
key input assumptions (e.g., GDP growth) and constructing 
a common set of scenarios. For example, in the international 
Integrated Assessment Modelling (IAM) community, 
there is increasing reliance on protocols that specify such 
harmonization (Kriegler et al. 2014, Supplementary materials; 
Kriegler et al. 2015, Appendix A, 39), an approach that could 
fruitfully be followed for national models. Such common 
scenarios need not limit the diversity of modeled scenarios. 
Rather, they can complement them by providing a basis for 
isolating the effect of model peculiarities. 
Third, it is important for policymakers to understand the 
potential and limits of the models. For example, as the 
discussion on costs above suggests, since energy bottom-up 
models and macroeconomic models can better characterize 
different types of costs (investment costs and macroeconomic 
effects, respectively), creating soft links between these models 
can improve the overall characterization of policy costs. 
None of the models presented here credibly combine energy 
specificity with macroeconomic effects. Of critical importance 
to scenario analysis for climate policy is the resulting costs of 
mitigation in different sectors and for different scenarios; this, 
as an explicit outcome, is missing across all studies. 
If models are set up to incorporate multiple policy objectives, 
scenario analysis can be used to understand trade-offs 
between different objectives. However, the studies at best 
consider cost minimization and energy security, while 
several just project emissions. Several studies aim to address 
environmental co-benefits such as water and air pollution, 
which is a welcome development, but as yet, have made at 
most a beginning in doing so.
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Fourth, in order to communicate clearly with policymakers, 
it is helpful if the representation of outputs is clear 
and appropriately explained. Perhaps most important, 
understanding a model’s sensitivity to different key input 
assumptions, such as technology cost or GDP, is essential for 
policy interpretation. None of the model scenarios studied 
here present sensitivities of outcomes to various inputs. In 
addition, selectively presenting underlying data, such as 
critical cost data for different technologies would help explain 
different outcomes across models without being burdensome. 
In addition, studies should ideally explain the key drivers of 
results and their associated uncertainties to help policymakers 
intuitively understand the dynamics of models, so that results 
are understood within the scope of their original intention 
(Krey 2014). For example, CSTEP and IESS explain clearly that 
their approach is an accounting rather than optimization 
approach, with the addition of electricity and transport sector 
specific models for CSTEP. In the case of LCSIG, key outcomes 
such as on the rate of penetration of renewables and electric 
vehicles are driven almost entirely by input outcomes rather 
than by choices made by the model, but this link between 
input and outputs are not presented sufficiently clearly. 
Finally, the constructive use of models for policy would 
benefit from an institutional framework that can formalize 
dialogue and interaction between modelling groups and 
policymakers, as well as the development of a common 
platform of key assumptions and scenarios. This would help 
provide consistency of input assumptions and construction 
of more robust reference scenarios as well as an ongoing 
platform for model comparison. This need not stifle diverse 
approaches across modelling groups as long as the scope 
for harmonization is clearly defined and agreed. Critically, 
any such institutional structures need to be long-lasting and 
foster a conversation over time. India has the benefit of several 
modelling groups and relatively high capacity. Building on this 
base to address the issues discussed here would yield even 
greater returns and greatly enhance the robustness and policy 
salience of modelling efforts.
First, Indian energy policy-making would be well-served by 
greater clarity on future energy and emission trends. Existing 
studies present a broad range of reference case results, driven 
by divergent assumptions, making their use for policy-
making a challenge. Studies would better inform policy if 
accompanied by greater explanation of their results, points 
of divergence (e.g., renewable and nuclear penetration) and 
more information on particular areas (e.g. energy demand 
and overall cost accounting). Policy scenarios lack common 
measures necessary to make their results comparable.
Second, the studies collectively provide, at best, a limited basis 
for selecting an economy wide pledge for India’s INDC, such as 
an emissions intensity target. Reference emissions ranges are 
broad and limited information is available on costs of policy 
options. A consideration of sectoral actions would provide 
a complementary approach that relies less on long-term 
economy-wide projections.
With an eye to the future, India needs to enhance the 
process for energy and climate scenario analysis, led by the 
government, but built on an ongoing process of engagement 
with the broader modelling and policy research community. 
Further, over time, modelling capacity should be extended 
to analyze social and environmental outcomes. A structured 
process to inform strategic thinking on energy and climate 
change would be a prudent long-term investment.
KEY MESSAGES
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NOTES
12.  Recent government targets of 100GW solar capacity 
translate to 166 TWh, and wind capacity of 60GW to 
131 TWh for a total of 297 TWh. Computed by authors 
assuming capacity utilization factors from CERC of .25 for 
wind and 0.25 for solar. See CERC (2015).
13.  For example, China intends to increase the share of non-
fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20% 
by 2030. See U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate 
Change. Beijing, China, 12 November 2014.
14.  CAIT 2.0: WRI’s climate data explorer. http://cait2.wri.org/
(accessed March 2, 2015). 
15.  In order to make the studies comparable, GDP figures have 
been converted to USD at 2007 prices.
16.  Costs do not include R&D, institutional and other related 
infrastructure costs. See TERI (2013), pp. 72.
17.  Calculated from NCAER Table 4-5, to net present value, 
using 10% discount rate, and converted to annual $2007-
PPP.
18.  Converted from $1,344 billion cumulative for 2011-2030 in 
2011 prices to annual $2007PPP. Discounted value assumes 
equal losses per year, because actual values are not known. 
19.  Calculation by authors: 138 TWh (IESS) in 2030, assuming 
20% capacity utilization factor, yields 79 GW.
1.    Hof et al. (2014) suggest that there are systematic 
difference between national and international studies for 
India and China.
2.  The Government of India has commissioned a study to 
inform India’s climate contribution, but the results of this 
study are not available as yet.
3.  All studies limit their scope to only CO2, except NCAER 
which also includes N2O emissions. Since N2O emissions 
were <5% of CO2 emissions in 2011, with a decreasing over 
time, our analysis focuses only on CO2. All studies except 
for the World Bank include all industrial CO2 emissions 
(including from electricity use, fossil fuel combustion and 
chemical processes), though it is likely that small- and 
medium- industry are universally not well represented 
due to limited data. The World Bank includes only the 
six energy intensive industries, which comprised about 
2/3rd of industrial output in 2005, and notably exclude 
agriculture. Regarding residential cooking demand, the 
macroeconomic models (LCSIG and NCAER) include fossil 
use, but not traditional biomass, while among the energy 
models World Bank does not include cooking demand.
4.  Personal communication, authors, LCSIG, January 30, 2015.
5.  A similar model by the same group provides more detail on 
inclusion (IRADE 2014).
6.  TERI has a complementary Energy Security Outlook study 
(Soni et al. 2015) that discusses this issue in detail, which is 
not considered here because GHG emission numbers were 
not available. 
7.  Computed as 1000 MGD which is approximately 1.6 BCM/y. 
See Government of Delhi (no date).
8.  Computed from ‘India: Balances for 2010’, Statistics, 
International Energy Agency. http://www.iea.org/statistics/
statisticssearch/report/?year=2010&country=INDIA&prod
uct=Balances (accessed April 7, 2015).
9.  See Planning Commission (2011).
10. Calculated by authors as follows: 99-282 TWh at a capacity 
utilization factor of 77%, results in 15-42 GW of capacity. 
11.  See MNRE (2010); Press Information Bureau (2015).
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Industry 1899.0 5871.0 5350.0 6236.0 6236.0 5809.0 5809.0 7314.0 5348.8
Buildings 5 2077.2 2470.0 2088.0 2679.0 2679.0 2001.0 2001.0 4081.4 3686.0
Agriculture 281.3 590.0 548.0 631.0 631.0 439.0 439.0 674.4 430.2
Transport 674.6 2571.0 1788.0 2900.0 2900.0 2178.0 2178.0 4488.4 3000.0
Total FED 4932.1 11502.0 9774.0 12446.0 12446.0 10427.0 10427.0 16558.1 12465.1
CSTEP  
2030
Reference 
Scenario 
Reference 
Scenario 
Study Name 1,2,3
Policy 
Scenario 
Policy 
Scenario 
IESS 
2032
TERI - WWF
2031
Reference 
Scenario 
Weak Policy 
Scenario 
Intermediate 
Policy  
Scenario
Stringent 
Policy 
Scenario
Notes
1 Data obtained upon request from co-authors when unavailable in reports.
2 See Table 1 for a description of the Reference and Weak, Intermediate and Stringent Policy Scenarios. 
3 No data available for LCSIG, NCAER, Shukla et al. and World Bank studies (email correspondance with report co-authors).
4 Data for 2010-2011, Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation (2012).
5 Includes domestic and commercial lighting and appliances, green building design and envelope savings, and cooking.
Coal 309.3 829.8 675.7 914.0 579.0 878.4 859.5 728.2 651.1 819.7 588.8 768.4 654.7 608.3 478.4
Oil 168.8 426.0 332.0 525.0 341.0 256.8 256.0 266.6 262.7 398.5 356.9 437.6 404.6 311.4 311.4
Gas 56.6 198.0 225.0 118.0 130.0 133.3 146.6 178.2 181.4 120.3 129.1 153.3 145.6 149.7 124.2
Reference 
Scenario
Reference 
Scenario
Reference 
Scenario
Reference 
Scenario 
Reference 
Scenario
Intermediate 
Policy 
Scenario
Intermediate 
Policy
Scenario
Policy  
Scenario
Policy  
Scenario
Policy  
Scenario 
Weak 
Policy 
Scenario
Weak 
Policy 
Scenario
Stringent  
Policy 
Scenario
Stringent  
Policy 
Scenario
Study 
Name 
1,2,3,4
LCSIG 6
2030
CSTEP 
2030
TERI - WWF 
2031
Shukla et al. 
2030
IESS 
2032
Notes
1 For NCAER and the World Bank, data for TPES were requested but were unavailable. 
2 See Table 1 for a description of the Reference and Weak, Intermediate and Stringent Policy Scenarios. 
3 Data obtained upon request from co-authors when unavailable in reports.  
4 Conversion factors used: 1 EJ = 23.885 MTOE (Source: IEA), 1 TWh = 0.086 MTOE (Source: IEA).      
5 Base Year data from Coal Controller’s Organization (2012), Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas (2013), Ministry of Coal (2011).
6  Sourced from Table 2.3 in the online version of the report, instead of Figure 2.11, or Table 2.3 in the published version of the report, to enable 
comparability between fossil fuel share in the report’s electricity supply mix and total primary fossil fuel supply. Conversion factors are from 
conversion tables on page xi of the report.
TABLE A1: FINAL ENERGY DEMAND (FED) BY SECTOR (TWh)
TABLE A2: TOTAL PRIMARY FOSSIL FUEL ENERGY SUPPLY (MTOE)
Base Year 4 
2010
Base Year 5 
2012
APPENDIX 
Sector
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Reference 
Scenario
Reference 
Scenario 
Reference 
Scenario 
Reference 
Scenario 
Reference 
Scenario 
Intermediate 
Policy 
Scenario
Intermediate 
Policy 
Scenario
Policy 
Scenario 
Policy  
Scenario 
Policy  
Scenario 
Weak Policy 
Scenario
Weak 
Policy 
Scenario
Stringent  
Policy 
Scenario
Stringent  
Policy 
Scenario
Fuel Type 1,2,3
LCSIG 5
2030
CSTEP 7
2030
Shukla et al. 6
2030
IESS 8
2032
TERI - WWF 9
2031
Coal 652.2 3038.0 2200.0 2124.2 2052.4 2124.2 1238.3 2405.0 1682.0 1811.0 1811.0 1811.0 1002.0 2488.5 1398.9
Gas 80.2 95.0 128.0 195.1 195.1 195.1 26.8 105.0 102.0 250.0 250.0 250.0 110.0 251.8 410.7
Nuclear 32.6 32.0 280.0 282.4 282.4 282.4 282.4 99.0 371.0 116.0 116.0 116.0 146.0 199.8 22.9
Hydro 122.1 131.0 230.0 388.9 388.9 388.9 388.9 224.0 243.0 231.0 231.0 231.0 270.0 358.6 398.7
Solar  1.2 8.0 275.0 - - - - 50.0 237.0 138.0 263.0 138.0 263.0 102.6 180.6
Wind 25.9 50.0 279.0 - - - - 93.0 280.0 240.0 304.0 240.0 452.0 173.4 448.9
Biomass 8.9 13.0 70.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 21.9 27.0 71.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 77.1 91.1
Others 8.5 3.0 3.0 392.2 458.9 392.2 862.4 -3.0 -242.0 432.0 109.0 92.0 109.0 18.6 19.7
Total 931.4 3370.0 3465.0 3383.4 3378.4 3383.4 2820.6 3000.0 2744.0 3218.0 3084.0 2878.0 2352.0 3670.4 2971.7
Notes 
1 See Table 1 for a description of the Reference and Weak, Intermediate and Stringent Policy Scenarios. 
2 Data obtained upon request from co-authors when unavailable in reports.
3 No data available for NCAER study (email correspondance with report co-author on 29 January 2015). World Bank available only in GW and hence 
not included due to lack of comparability. 
4 Base year data from Central Electricity Authority (2012a, 2012b).
5 Coal numbers include sub-critical and super-critical coal.
6  Data converted from EJ to TWh as follows: 1 EJ = 277.78 TWh (Source: IEA). Coal values include coal with and without CCS; gas values include gas 
with and without CCS; biomass includes biomass with and without CCS.  
7  Solar includes solar PV and CSP; wind includes onshore and offshore wind; others forms the electricity balancing requirement with the addition of 
electricity imports and reduction of electricity exports. A negative number implies net exports. 
8  Coal includes domestic coal and imported coal-based generation (for reference: 771 TWh and 2451 TWh respectively); solar includes solar PV and 
CSP; wind includes onshore and offshore wind; others includes small hydro, biomass and biogas, waste to electricity, and imports.  
9 Solar includes Solar PV and Solar Thermal. Wind includes Onshore Wind and Offshore Wind, Others includes Waste, Geothermal, Tidal and Diesel.
TABLE A3: ELECTRICITY SUPPLY MIX (TWh)
Base Year 4 
2012
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Study Name 1,2,3,4,5,6
LCSIG (2007-2030) 2007 1429.0 5271.0 - 3830.0 -
NCAER (2003/04-2030/31) 2003 1004.6 4000.1 3965.5 3876.2 3756.2
TERI - WWF (2001-2031)  2001 920.0 5440.0 - 3550.0 -
Shukla et al. (2005-2030)  2005 1213.9 4531.3 4475.1 3864.9 3420.5
CSTEP  (2012-2030)  2012 1800.0 5600.0 - 4500.0 -
World Bank (2007-2031)  2007 1324.0 4686.0 - 3872.0 -
IESS (2012-2032)  2012 1726.0 5674.0 5186.0 4717.0 4071.0
Base Year
 Year Emissions
2030/31/32 7
Reference 
Scenario  
Weak Policy
Scenario
Single Policy or 
Intermediate 
Policy Scenario
Stringent  
Policy  
Scenario
NOTES 
1  All data show CO2 emissions except NCAER, which includes N2O emissions. The breakdown was unavailable. N2O emissions were <5% of CO2  
emissions in 2011, and its share has been decreasing with time.
2 CO2 emissions are for all sectors except for the World Bank study which excludes agriculture.
3  In all the charts, only the base year and 2030 (or equivalent) year’s data were available from the model studies. The reference and policy range lines 
have been interpolated.
4 See Table 1 for a description of the Reference and Weak, Intermediate and Stringent Policy Scenarios. 
5 End year varies by study from 2030 to 2032.
6 Data obtained upon request from co-authors when unavailable in reports.    
7 Some reports provide data upto 2047-2051. Available data in the range 2030-32 has been selected to enable comparison between studies.
Base Year
 YearStudy Name 1,2,3,4,5,6 Per Capita 
Emissions
2030/31/32 7
Reference  
Scenario
Weak Policy 
Scenario
Single Policy or 
Intermediate  
Policy Scenario
Stringent  
Policy Scenario
LCSIG (2007-2030)  2007 1.30 3.60 - 2.6 -
NCAER (2003/04-2030/31)  2003 0.95 2.77 2.75 2.69 2.60
TERI - WWF (2001-2031) 8 2001 0.89 3.57 - 2.33 -
Shukla et al. (2005-2030) 9 2005 1.02 2.86 2.82 2.44 2.16
CSTEP  (2012-2030) 10 2012 1.60 3.65 - 2.93 -
World Bank (2007-2031) 11 2007 1.29 3.58 - 2.96 -
IESS (2012-2032)  2012 1.40 3.70 3.40 3.10 2.70
NOTES
1 to 7 See Table A4 Notes.        
8 to 11   CO2 Per Capita in the base year calculated as = Total CO2 (base year)/Population(base year), and CO2 Per Capita for all scenarios calculated as = 
Total CO2 (2030-32)/Population(2030-32).
TABLE A4: ANNUAL CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS (Million Tonnes)
TABLE A5: CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS PER CAPITA (Tonnes)
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Base Year
 YearStudy Name 1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9   Emissions 
Intensity 
2030/31/32 7
Reference  
Scenario  
Weak Policy 
Scenario
Single Policy  
or Intermediate 
Policy Scenario
Stringent  
Policy Scenario
LCSIG (2007-2030) 10 2007 0.430 0.330 - 0.250 -
NCAER (2003/04-2030/31) 11 2003 0.333 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135
TERI - WWF (2001-2031)  2001 0.475 0.261 - 0.171 -
Shukla et al. (2005-2030) 12 2005 No data No data No data No data No data
CSTEP  (2012-2030)  2012 0.413 0.356 - 0.286 -
World Bank (2007-2031)  2007 0.490 0.304 - 0.251 -
IESS (2012-2032)  2012 0.396 0.301 0.275 0.250 0.216
NOTES
1 to 7 See Table A4 Notes 
8  Historical Emissions Intensity is calculated using total annual emissions (MTCO2)from WRI-CAIT for the base year and GDP numbers from the  
 RBI for 2004-05 base year market prices converted to 2007 dollar GDP. 
9   All numbers are in units of kgCO2/$GDP PPP-2007. Numbers were converted from their original units to enable comparison. For reports 
specifying both annual emissions and GDP, emissions intensity has been computed by dividing annual emissions by GDP with approriate 
conversion factors. For the CSTEP and IESS reports, the base year GDP has been sourced from statistical data provided by the RBI (http://dbie.
rbi.org.in/DBIE/dbie.rbi?site=statistics) and the CAGR provided by the report has been factored in to compute scenario end-year GDPs.  
10   Data sourced from the LCSIG report, Section 2.4 (page 27) after clarification with the modelling team at IRADe, and not from figure 2.8 which 
shows different emissions numbers.   
11   NCAER data have been plotted but excluded from the envelopes, because, since the study dates from 2009, the starting point falls 
substantially short of actual historical data.
12  No data available for the Shukla et al. study (email correspondance with report co-author on 29 January 2015).
TABLE A6: CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS INTENSITY (kgCO2/$GDP PPP-2007)
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